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AI Authors in Copyright and First 
Amendment Law 
Margot E. Kaminski* 
Technology is often characterized as an outside force, with essential 
qualities, acting on the law. But the law, through both doctrine and theory, 
constructs the meaning of the technology it encounters. A particular 
feature of a particular technology disrupts the law only because the law 
has been structured in a way that makes that feature relevant. The law, in 
other words, plays a significant role in shaping its own disruption. This 
Essay is a study of how a particular technology, artificial intelligence, is 
framed by both copyright law and the First Amendment. How the 
algorithmic author is framed by these two areas illustrates the importance 
of legal context and legal construction to the disruption story. 
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Technology is often characterized as an outside force that operates 
upon the law to disturb it.1 Napster breaks copyright law;2 3D printing 
 
 * Copyright © 2017 Margot E. Kaminski. Associate Professor of Law, Colorado 
Law; Faculty Director, Silicon Flatirons. Thanks to Jack Balkin for the opportunity to 
co-teach our Robotics seminar a few years ago, which gave rise to these ideas. Thanks 
to Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Meg Leta Jones, Kate Klonick, Toni Massaro, Christina 
Mulligan, and Nicholson Price for comments and feedback. All mistakes are my own. 
 1 See Meg Leta Jones, Does Technology Drive Law? The Dilemma of 
Technological Exceptionalism in Cyberlaw 6 (June 8, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2981855 (“[U]ntil 
recently the debate around technological exceptionalism has been not whether it 
exists, but when it exists. When is a technology so new and so different that it will 
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breaks patent law;3 the internet challenges First Amendment and 
communications law;4 Uber breaks employment law;5 the Internet of 
Things upends Fourth Amendment law.6 In reality, the picture is far 
more complex. The law can itself drive technological development; 
technologists often design around legal entitlements.7 To the extent 
new technology (or really, the social practice of a new technology8) 
disrupts the law, it does so because of how it encounters existing 
features of the law, both doctrinal and theoretical. The law, in 
constructing — that is, building the meaning of — new technological 
 
drive significant legal change? When is a technology so novel that the law, as 
established, breaks and cannot account for it?”). 
 2 See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster 
and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) (describing 
how Napster challenged and ultimately changed copyright law). 
 3 See, e.g., Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D 
Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1695-96 (2014) (arguing 
that the ease of copying something through a 3D printer “kills” patents); Mark A. 
Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 462-63 (2014) (“Unless 
they strictly control and limit the sale and manufacture of 3D printers and gene 
printers, they may find themselves unable to prevent the production of unauthorized 
designs.”). 
 4 See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom 
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-10 (2004) (identifying 
four features of the digital environment that challenge freedom of expression and 
related areas of law: the low cost of copying; the fact that content goes across borders; 
the low cost of building on (“glomming on”) to existing content; the lower costs of 
distribution which democratize speech) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital Speech]. 
 5 See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 97-98 
(2016) (describing how Uber disrupts employment law — but also noting that this 
disruption of categories has been occurring in non-Uber-related cases as well). 
 6 See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth 
Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805 (2016) (discussing how the Internet of 
Things disrupts Fourth Amendment law); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of 
Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 
TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014) (discussing how the Internet of Things disrupts law more 
generally speaking). 
 7 See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) 
(describing how defendants built a device consisting of various small antennas in a 
warehouse to allow unlicensed live streaming of television, in an attempt to give 
control to individual system users to achieve a favorable copyright law decision). 
 8 Technology is not an object; it is the social use of an object. See, e.g., Jack M. 
Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 48-49 (2015) (“[W]hat lawyers 
call ‘technology’ is usually a shorthand for something far more complex . . . . (1) how 
people interact with new inventions and (2) how people interact with other people 
using those new inventions or presupposing those new inventions.”) [hereinafter 
Balkin, Robotics Law]; see also Jones, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Balabanian) 
(“[T]echnology means not simply a collection of machines, but the relationships 
among them, their uses, and their relationship between them and people.”). 
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developments and their social uses, takes a central part in its own 
disruption.9 
Conceiving of technology as some outside force that acts upon the 
law can lead to a technology-centric approach in which one tries to 
identify what features of a particular technology are legally 
disruptive.10 This kind of disruption narrative gets it wrong. A 
particular feature of a particular technology disrupts the law only 
because the law has been structured — doctrinally and theoretically — 
in a way that makes that feature relevant.11 The disruptive effects (if 
any) of a technology become manifest when they encounter, interface 
with, and are given particular meaning within the law. 
This Essay is a study of the way a particular technology, artificial 
intelligence, encounters and is incorporated into two distinct scenes of 
regulation:12 copyright and First Amendment law. Artificial 
intelligence (“AI”) appears to pose challenges for both of these areas of 
U.S. law, because both areas at first glance appear to center on human 
speakers or authors. Can an artificially intelligent author or speaker 
receive copyright protection? Can it (he, she?) be protected by the 
First Amendment? 
The algorithmic “author,” it turns out, gets framed differently by 
these two different legal areas, with differently disruptive results. This 
illustrates the importance of legal context in the disruption story — 
 
 9 Balkin, Robotics Law, supra note 8, at 50 (observing that the importance of 
certain purportedly disruptive features of robots “arises from the way that a new 
technology interacts with a social and legal world already in place,” what he calls the 
“scene of regulation.”). 
 10 Jones, supra note 1, at 2 (“For Calo, and others . . . ’essential qualities’ of 
technology ‘drive the law and policy conversations that attend them.’ The task for law 
scholars . . . is then to identify those qualities . . . .”); see Ryan Calo, Robotics and the 
Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 516 (2015) [hereinafter Calo, Lessons of 
Cyberlaw]. As Calo explains, one “essential quality” of robots is that they are 
physically embodied; a robot can be characterized as disrupting U.S. tort law because 
unlike software that causes only virtual crashes, robots cause physical crashes in 
physical spaces. Id. at 533-34 (“Robots . . . differ from computers and software 
precisely in that they are organized to act upon the world”); see also M. Ryan Calo, 
Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 598-601 (2011). 
 11 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); see also Balkin, 
Robotics Law, supra note 8, at 50 (“The problem . . . is not simply a feature of essential 
characteristics of a technology. Rather, it arises from the way that a new technology 
interacts with a social and legal world already in place.”). As several scholars have 
now observed, the fact that a robot can cause physical harm may break down our 
scheme for addressing software liability, but only because the U.S. system has created 
limitations on liability for information harms. See Jones, supra note 1, at 6. 
 12 Balkin, supra note 8, at 50 (calling the “social and legal world already in place” 
the “scene of regulation”). 
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and the relative unimportance of particular features of the technology 
itself. 
The law’s existing construction of authorship paves the way for 
whether and how the law is or is not disrupted by AI authors. If U.S. 
copyright law constructed authorship as requiring a spark of human 
brilliance, or if U.S. free speech law constructed speech protection as 
being primarily about protecting individual human autonomy, there 
would be little space in either for protecting AI speakers. If, on the 
other hand, either or both areas of the law focused more on the needs 
of audience members than the rights of human speakers, then AI or 
emergent authors could more easily be incorporated into those 
systems of legal meaning. This shows that when it comes to assessing 
the extent of legal disruption, the details of a particular legal landscape 
and its underlying theories are often as important as the features of a 
particular technology.13 The AI author does not disrupt law in a 
vacuum, because the law constructs authorship differently in different 
contexts. 
Technology thus does not just act upon the law; it encounters and is 
framed by it. Technology can make salient or foreground existing 
features of the law.14 But this description is incomplete; technology is 
not just a stable lens through which we see stable aspects of the law. It 
takes on a particular meaning within the law depending on what one 
thinks the law is or should be. The law constructs — makes meaning 
of — technologies.15 And that process of construction lays the 
groundwork for whether and how a particular technology creates 
challenges for the legal system. 
In a forthcoming longer work,16 I address the details and 
consequences of this construction process, and what it means for 
understanding, anticipating, and even designing law for legal 
disruption. In that work, I also take on the project of identifying 
 
 13 See id. (“Instead of saying that law is responding to essential features of new 
technology, it might be better to say that social struggles over the use of new 
technology are being inserted into existing features of law, disrupting expectations 
about how to categorize situations.”). 
 14 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 4, at 2 (“[D]igital technologies change the 
social conditions in which people speak, and [thus] . . . bring to light features of 
freedom of speech that have always existed in the background but now become 
foregrounded.”).  
 15 See Jones, supra note 1, at 4 (“[C]yberlaw research should consider the ways in 
which technologies, practices and social arrangements are constructed within certain 
legal contexts: the legal construction of technology.”). 
 16 Margot E. Kaminski, Legal Disruption: How Technology Disrupts the Law 
(2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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different kinds and different levels of disruption — when law is just 
business as usual, versus when technology truly challenges it. In this 
Essay, I focus on the process of legal construction: the importance of 
understanding how the law makes meaning of technologies. I show 
how one type of technology can be a lens through which we better see 
the law.17 It can cause a move up from statutes or doctrine to 
reassessing the theory behind them. But technology is very rarely so 
disruptive that it causes the law to be unable to function. I join Meg 
Jones in calling for a different analytical approach: we should identify 
and analyze how the law constructs technology, rather than yielding 
to a narrative that a technology is intrinsically disruptive.18 Law is, I 
argue here, an important player in its own disruption. 
I. ALGORITHMIC AUTHORSHIP: THE CASE STUDY 
Algorithmic or AI authorship seems poised to disrupt several areas 
of law that at their core concern the human author. Roughly speaking, 
algorithmic authorship is authorship by an algorithm — a computer 
program, rather than a human. Artificial intelligence usually refers to a 
more sophisticated and independent version of an algorithm; a closely 
related term is “emergence,” which describes programs that produce 
outputs their programmers and users could not predict.19 Examples of 
algorithmic (though not necessarily emergent) authors include the 
following: Google’s DeepDream has generated artwork;20 the What-If 
Machine came up with the premises and characters for a (not very 
good) West End musical;21 and the computer program Iamus 
 
 17 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 4, at 2; see also Toni M. Massaro & Helen 
Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. L. Rev. 1169, 
1171 (2016). 
 18 Jones, supra note 1, at 4. 
 19 Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 10, at 532, 538 (“[S]ystems that do more 
than merely repeat instructions but adapt to circumstance.”); id. at 539-40 (reviewing 
a deeper discussion of emergence versus autonomy and the famous Turing test). 
 20 Robert Hart, If an AI Creates a Work of Art, Who Owns the Rights to It?, QUARTZ 
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://qz.com/1054039/google-deepdream-art-if-an-ai-creates-a-work-
of-art-who-owns-the-rights-to-it; Matt McFarland, Google’s Psychedelic “Paint Brush” 
Raises the Oldest Question in Art, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/03/10/googles-psychedelic-paint-brush-
raises-the-oldest-question-in-art.  
 21 See Mark Brown, World’s First Computer-Generated Musical to Debut in London, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2015/dec/01/beyond-
the-fence-computer-generated-musical-greenham-common; Lyn Gardner, Beyond the 
Fence Review — Computer-Created Show Is Sweetly Bland, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2016/feb/28/beyond-the-fence-review-computer-
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composed music performed in 2012 by the London Symphony 
Orchestra.22 Are these machine-created outputs protected by copyright 
law or protected as free speech? Should they be? These questions have 
already spawned significant debate.23 
In the abstract, algorithmic authorship fundamentally challenges the 
notion of the romantic author or speaker: an individual human being 
who produces creative output during moments of enlightened 
creativity.24 The romantic author is profoundly human; her creativity 
stems, in fact, from her humanity. Romanticizing creativity as some 
essential aspect of human identity is harder to do when a machine can 
produce the same creative works. Similarly, it is harder to romanticize 
free expression as an essential output of human autonomy when 
machines can spew out news, poems, and op-eds.25 
Algorithmic authorship in reality constitutes a spectrum of 
practices, many of which do not meaningfully challenge either 
philosophical stances on authorship or the U.S. legal system.26 For 
example, when Google’s DeepDream art was sold, the human artists 
who used the program kept the money — that is, they were for all 
 
created-musical-arts-theatre-london (describing the resulting show Beyond the Fence 
as “risibly stereotypical”); Stewart Pringle, Beyond the Fence: How Computers Spawned 
a Musical, NEW SCIENTIST (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.newscientist.com/article/ 
2079483-beyond-the-fence-how-computers-spawned-a-musical.  
 22 Philip Ball, Iamus, Classical Music’s Computer Composer, Live from Malaga, 
GUARDIAN (July 1, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2012/jul/01/iamus-
computer-composes-classical-music.  
 23 See, e.g., Bruce E. Boyden, Emergent Works, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377, 379 
(2016); James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work, 39 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 407-08 (2016); see also Toni M. Massaro et al., Siri-ously 2.0: 
What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481, 
2483 (2017). 
 24 Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent 
Author, STAN. TECH. L. REV., no. 5, 2012, at 4 (describing Roland Barthes’s and Michel 
Foucault’s critiques of “the idea of the author as an individual creative personality, a 
solitary originator of stylistically consistent works”); id. (referring to romantic 
authorship as both “individualistic” and “proprietary”). 
 25 Did a Human or a Computer Write This?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/08/opinion/sunday/algorithm-human-
quiz.html.  
 26 For a discussion of some of these difference practices, see Boyden, supra note 
23, at 379 (“[T]he problem of computer-generated works is not a single problem, but 
rather a set of related problems, some of which are easier than others to resolve.”); id. 
at 380-81 (discussing a spectrum of examples, from “mad-lib” style algorithms where 
machines fill in the blanks, to story-generating algorithms that are sometimes 
indistinguishable from human-authored pieces); see also id. at 385-89. 
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practical purposes considered to be the works’ authors.27 One artist 
described the program as a “paintbrush”: a tool used to further a 
human author’s vision.28 A creative algorithm can, at least in the right 




My dog, Iggy/ My dog, Iggy, run through DeepDream’s DaVinci processor. 
Credit Matthew R. Cushing (and DeepDream)(and maybe DaVinci) 
 
The chair of digital arts at the Pratt Institute, however, suggested 
that the algorithm’s human creators deserved credit, too.29 A second 
approach to algorithmic authorship is thus to deem the human 
authors of the algorithm as in some way co-authors of the resulting 
work. For practical purposes in at least the near future, the central 
question of algorithmic authorship will likely be a factual one: 
whether the algorithm looks more like a tool, or whether the 
algorithm’s programmers look more like co-authors.30 
 
 27 McFarland, supra note 20.  
 28 Id. 
 29 McFarland, supra note 20 (“Patchen thinks credit for Atken’s work should be 
shared between the artist and the algorithm’s creators.”). 
 30 See Grimmelmann, supra note 23, at 407-08. See generally REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS, SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (1966), 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/archive/ar-1965.pdf. 
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Finally, there is the more hypothetical question of what to do about 
Strong AI: as-yet-nonexistent (and in all likelihood never existent) 
artificial intelligence that operates independently of humans.31 What if 
DeepDream were DeeperDreamer, and came up with output on its 
own instead of serving as a stylistic tool for human artists? How does 
the law handle machines that truly think? Or, leaving aside the 
controversial requirement of consciousness, how does the law handle 
works that are recognizably creative to a human audience, but are the 
result of machine creation rather than deliberate human input?32 This 
question of what to do about emergence — that is, machine output 
that cannot be predicted by the humans involved — is the hardest 
from a legal perspective. It may require a move up from analogizing 
algorithms to existing doctrine and practices — using paintbrushes, 
having co-authors — to analyzing why we have particular areas of law 
in the first place, and the algorithms’ relationships to those larger 
purposes. 
II. ALGORITHMIC AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 
Algorithmic authorship is treated differently in different subparts of 
the legal system. This is because of differences in how those subparts 
of the legal system operate and are theorized — and more specifically, 
differences in how they theorize authorship.33 These differences show 
that legal disruption does not stem from the technology alone, but 
from the law it encounters. Technology that is greatly disruptive in 
one legal area can be not-so-disruptive in another. The determinant of 
the level of disruption is not just the technology by itself, but how it is 
constructed by the law. Contemplating algorithmic authorship also 
shows how law can be disrupted on different levels — doctrinal, or 
 
 31 See Massaro et al., supra note 23, at 2483. 
 32 See Boyden, supra note 23, at 390 (describing emergence); id. at 378, 384 
(describing the problem as follows: “works that consist largely of creative elements 
that have emerged unbidden from the operation of the program,” that is, a situation 
where there are “at least two works at issue, one of which produces the other”); see 
also Stuart M. Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1482 (2013) 
(reviewing whether the First Amendment protects algorithmic speech). 
 33 As argued in this Essay, I believe the concept of authorship in these two areas of 
law to be distinct. There has been a recent trend, however, towards proposing 
unification. See Derek E. Bambauer, Copyright = Speech, 65 EMORY L.J. 199, 200-01 
(2016) (proposing to unify the First Amendment and copyright law) [hereinafter 
Bambauer, Copyright]; Christopher Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102 
VA. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (2015) (arguing that for purposes of copyright law, “to be an 
author of a writing, one must intend to produce a mental effect in an audience,” which 
resembles the First Amendment’s Spence test, discussed further below). 
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theoretical, requiring us to resort to theory to determine why subparts 
of the legal system exist.34 
For example, assessing copyright protection for algorithmically 
authored works both illuminates features of existing U.S. law and 
illustrates the law’s role in its own disruption. Although the Copyright 
Office recently stated that works must be authored by a human to 
receive copyright protection,35 that determination is likely not the end 
of the question of how to treat machine speech.36 
Algorithmic authorship could be handled under copyright law in 
any number of ways.37 A software programmer could be deemed the 
author and thus the owner of the program’s output. Or the user of the 
computer could be the author; the programmer and user could be 
joint authors; or, neither could be the author and the work could go 
un-owned.38 Who gets to be called the work’s author, and who gets to 
benefit from copyright’s incentives, is a matter less of technological 
details of AI than of how we theorize authorship and ownership in the 
U.S. copyright system. 
At first glance, human authorship may seem central to copyright 
law. The utilitarian purpose of copyright law is to incentivize 
(presumably human) authors to create new works for the benefit of 
net social welfare.39 A natural rights theory of copyright, less 
emphasized in the United States, suggests that (human) authors 
 
 34 As Jack Balkin has noted, technological change can be a prism through which 
we view the law and learn its underlying principles. Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 
4, at 4 (noting that the “digital revolution alters our perspective on freedom of speech 
and leads to a series of disputes about what the free speech principle means”). 
 35 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 
§ 313.2 (3d ed. 2014), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium-12-22-
14.pdf (“Similarly, the Office will not register works produced by a machine or mere 
mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative 
input or intervention from a human author.”). 
 36 Judicial deference to the Copyright Office’s decisions is controversial. See e.g., 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 
1002 (No. 15-866), WL 94219, at *33-36 (discussing the circuit split over deference 
to the Copyright Office’s registration decisions). 
 37 See Boyden, supra note 23, at 383 (listing the various proposals for how to 
handle emergent authorship). 
 38 Id. at 391 (stating that “as a theoretical matter, there is no good reason to assign 
initial ownership rights over such works to anyone [because] no one needs to be 
incentivized to produce the output of the program” and incentive to create the 
program “is provided by the copyright in the program as a literary work”). 
 39 William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001), https://cyber.harvard. 
edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf.  
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deserve rewards for the labor they put into their creations.40 A moral 
rights, or personhood, theory of copyright suggests that (human) 
authors imbue their creations with an aspect of their personality, so 
that if the creation is stolen or harmed, an author’s personhood is 
afflicted.41 Each of these theories arguably depends on the humanness 
of an author.42 
Beyond theory, authorship appears in the Constitution: Congress 
may grant “Authors” copyright protection.43 The Copyright Act refers 
to “works of authorship”44 that are owned by “the author or authors of 
the work.”45 Human authorship thus might seem central to U.S. 
copyright law. 
Algorithmic authorship purportedly disrupts copyright law because 
it removes, or greatly distances, the human author from the work.46 If 
commentators are correct that much of U.S. copyright law rests on the 
antiquated eighteenth century notion of the romantic author — a 
human individual of lone genius inspired in a vacuum to create an 
original work — then it is certainly hard to fit an algorithmic author 
into that schema.47 
But U.S. copyright law — through its various players and 
interpreters, and at both theoretical and doctrinal levels — in fact 
 
 40 Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
892, 893-94 (2006). 
 41 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 
957 (1982) (exploring the connection between property rights and the personhood 
perspective). 
 42 Boyden, supra note 23, at 391. 
 43 The Progress Clause permits Congress to allocate monopolies for limited times 
to authors and inventors. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 44 17 C.F.R. § 102(a) (2017). 
 45 Id. § 201(a) (2017).  
 46 See, e.g., Boyden, supra note 23, at 380 (“Computer-generated works destabilize 
copyright law’s approach to authorship by obscuring the connection between the 
creative process and the work. Once that happens, it will no longer be possible to 
simply assume that all minimally creative elements stemmed from the mind of one or 
more human authors.”). But see Bridy, supra note 24, at 27 (“The increasing 
sophistication of generative software and the reality that all creativity is algorithmic 
compel recognition that AI-authored works are less heterogeneous to both their 
human counterparts and existing copyright doctrine than appearances may at first 
suggest.”); Grimmelmann, supra note 23, at 408 (arguing that even if there is distance 
created it does not change ownership as the author is “is simply [making] the choice 
to split the creative process into two stages rather than one”).  
 47 See THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND 
LITERATURE 2-3 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); Oren Bracha, The 
Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American 
Copyright, 118 YALE L. J. 186, 201 (2008). 
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constructs authorship in a way that allows considerable room for non-
human authorship. This starts with the underlying theory. The 
dominant theory of why we have copyright in the United States, 
utilitarianism, is more removed from the humanity of its author than, 
say, moral rights or natural rights theory. Moral rights theory focuses 
on a human’s personhood, natural rights on the fairness of rewarding 
human labor mixed with commons material. By contrast, by focusing 
on the net benefit creative works bring to society, utilitarianism 
addresses not just a sole human author but also the vast human 
audience that receives and benefits from both copyrighted works and 
ownership exceptions. 
Utilitarian theory makes the discussion of authorship a discussion 
about incentives and net social welfare rather than humanness: do the 
authors of algorithms need copyright as an incentive to produce 
algorithms that in turn produce creative works?48 Do the algorithms 
themselves?49 Utilitarianism suggests that works authored by an 
algorithm might bring equal value to a human audience as works 
authored by a human being.50 This theoretical framing makes it more 
possible that an algorithmically authored work might receive 
copyright protection in the United States than in countries that rely on 
moral rights. It changes the nature of the conversation from being 
about rewarding humans for creative endeavors to calibrating policy to 
a level that benefits society as a whole, including the human audiences 
of algorithmically authored works. 
The theoretical room for copyright protection of algorithmically 
authored works would have little impact if there were not also space 
in the doctrine. U.S. copyright law as currently developed has two 
doctrinal features that leave significant space for protecting 
algorithmic authorship: a low originality threshold, and work-made-
for-hire doctrine. 
Copyrighted works must be original.51 Originality proves to be a 
central doctrinal question of what authorship is, in copyright law.52 
 
 48 See Boyden, supra note 23, at 391 (suggesting ownership of copyright in the 
underlying program itself is enough of an incentive). 
 49 Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 
47 PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1199-200 (1986) (“Only those stuck in the doctrinal mud could 
ever think that computers could be ‘authors.’”). 
 50 See Massaro et al., supra note 23, at 2487-88 (“[I]f and when they produce 
information useful to natural persons who seek to participate in public discourse, 
strong AI speakers should warrant similar protection.”). 
 51 See Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (“We 
conclude that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not 
original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural’s 
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Whether authorship requires human genius, or human creativity, or 
any human input at all, comes down to how judges interpret the 
originality requirement. 
In early decisions, some judges and justices touted the importance 
of an individual and highly human creative spark, which would have 
resulted in a higher originality threshold.53 But as Oren Bracha 
observes, newly powerful economic actors — commercial publishers, 
textbook and dictionary publishers, advertisers, and more — pushed 
back against the doctrinal and legislative consequence of romantic 
authorship.54 An advertiser seeking copyright protection in 
advertisements would be ill-served by copyright doctrine that requires 
a high degree of (human) originality.55 Similarly, the publisher of 
commercial fiction would not want a judge to evaluate just how 
original a new mass-market paperback potboiler is. These actors 
argued largely successfully for judges to stay out of the process of 
determining adequate levels of creativity.56 Their arguments coincided, 
according to Bracha, with a philosophical shift towards evaluating the 
market value of objects rather than their intrinsic value, and the rise of 
the formalist, hands-off judge, in place of the judge who looks to 
social welfare.57 
The consequence over time was that the originality threshold 
lowered, now requiring just a “modicum of creativity” instead of 
human genius.58 Thus instead of assessing creativity, courts assess 
authorial process and actions, such as putting pen to paper.59 Justice 
 
combined white and yellow pages directory.”); see also Bridy, supra note 24, at 5. 
 52 See Bracha, supra note 47, at 186; Bridy, supra note 24, at 6. 
 53 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58-59 (1884) 
(holding that a high threshold of “novelty, invention, originality” was required); 
Bracha, supra note 47; Bridy, supra note 24, at 2, 6. 
 54 Bracha, supra note 47, at 212-13 (“Revised editions, serializations of existing 
works, and collected works volumes were embodiments of existing works with slight 
changes. To the extent that commercial actors wanted to rely on copyright protection 
in the context of such products, a substantial originality standard was out of the 
question.”). 
 55 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) 
(holding that advertisements for a circus are proper subjects of copyright). 
 56 See Bracha, supra note 47, at 218-23 (showing a move by the courts to review 
“implied intent” instead). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 340 (1991). 
 59 See Boyden, supra note 23, at 380 (“[T]hat inquiry has typically been carried 
out not by assessing the creativity of the material itself, but rather by considering the 
actions of the putative author . . . the court merely assumes that those choices and 
judgment calls — the author’s process-led to something creative in the work.”). 
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Holmes famously wrote that the creativity requirement in copyright 
can be met “even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in 
it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.”60 
The low originality threshold, which conflates the fact or process of 
creation with adequate human creativity,61 allows doctrinal room for a 
nonhuman author.62 Most work is original and therefore 
copyrightable; courts in practice rarely engage in asking whether an 
author is creative enough. Most works of algorithmic authorship will 
therefore meet the low Feist standard of showing a modicum of 
creativity.63 Thus originality doctrine, which is how the Constitution’s 
requirement of authorship manifests in practice, does not preclude 
algorithmic authorship. 
Another way of understanding this doctrinal space for algorithmic 
authorship is that in U.S. copyright law, judges are not supposed to 
make assessments of the creative value of works.64 Ostensibly this is to 
prevent the censorship of (or really, the disincentivizing of) works 
that judges do not like.65 It may also be related to the arc of art history; 
how is a non-art-expert judge to determine whether a Jackson Pollack 
is in fact valuable art? What this means in practice is that Barnett 
Newman’s zips (vertical strips of color down a color field) are as 
protected by copyright law as a DaVinci painting. (Of course, in 
practice judges make judgments about the creative value of works all 
the time.)66 This refusal to make aesthetic judgments about a work 
relates to the lack of a requirement of a human author. If judges must 
forebear from analyzing whether a particular work is creative enough 
and thus worth protecting, this keeps them from analyzing whether 
the author is creative enough and thus worth rewarding. 
 
 60 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250. 
 61 See Boyden, supra note 23, at 380. 
 62 Bridy, supra note 24, at 10-11, 27 (“AI authorship is readily assimilable to the 
current copyright framework . . . .”). 
 63 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (“The standard of originality is low, but it does 
exist.”). 
 64 This principle is referred to as aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine. Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges 
of the worth of pictorial illustrations . . . .”). 
 65 Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 
248 (1998) (referring to the “possibility of censorship” and explaining that “[i]f 
judges used their aesthetic tastes to make these determinations, they would 
presumably influence the kinds of art created in the future”). 
 66 Id. at 249 (discussing aesthetic analysis in judicial opinions and concluding that 
“the distinction between aesthetic reasoning and judicial reasoning is illusory”). 
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Looking at how an AI author could fit within the U.S. copyright 
regime reveals, as Annemarie Bridy has argued, just how far copyright 
law is in practice from requiring humanness of its creators.67 In fact, 
one form of authorship already exists, the work made for hire, that 
ascribes authorship to a non-human entity, the employer-corporation. 
A work made for hire is, generally speaking, a work made by an 
employee for an employer where the copyright vests in the employer, 
not the actual author. This concept of authorship differs greatly from 
the romantic model.68 Instead of author as sole (human) genius, the 
author is more like an automaton filling the dictates of her or his 
employer.69 According to Bracha, the work-for-hire model abandoned 
the “most fundamental tenet” of romantic authorship: “that authors 
would be owners.”70 According to Bridy, it could be the model for how 
to handle AI authorship.71 
Work-for-hire doctrine as currently legislated technically cannot 
address AI authorship, but Bridy suggests amending the Copyright 
Act, as other countries have, to explicitly cover certain computer-
created works.72 For Bridy, then, algorithmic authorship is not 
fundamentally disruptive, or really very disruptive at all. It just 
requires some tweaks to U.S. copyright law at the edges. 
This brings us to the underlying question: just how disruptive is AI 
authorship to U.S. copyright law? In my forthcoming longer work, I 
spend more time with this question — what is legal disruption, and 
how might we categorize different levels of disruptiveness. The 
discussion of AI authorship provides a good example of several 
possible layers of disruption: minor doctrinal, major doctrinal, and 
theoretical. 
Bridy believes the encounter between emergent machine authors 
and U.S. copyright law is just minor doctrinal disruption, requiring 
minor tweaks to copyright doctrine, not major doctrinal changes or 
shifts to underlying theory. Bruce Boyden, by contrast, argues that 
there is something new here — truly emergent algorithmic authorship 
 
 67 See Bridy, supra note 24, at 10-11; see also Bracha, supra note 47, at 254-55, 264. 
 68 See Bracha, supra note 47, at 259 (describing the author as a “wage laborer 
carrying out a routine task assigned to him and controlled by his supervisors”). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 260. 
 71 See Bridy, supra note 24, at 25-27 (“The work made for hire doctrine is a more 
fitting framework within which to situate the problem of AI authorship because it 
represents an existing mechanism for directly vesting ownership of a copyright in a 
legal person who is not the author-in-fact of the work in question.”). 
 72 Id. at 26-27 (discussing AI authorship work-for-hire policy suggestions and EU 
examples). 
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meaningfully disrupts copyright law. First, for Boyden, emergence 
causes more significant doctrinal disruption than Bridy observes. 
Boyden characterizes emergence as “a novel problem” for copyright 
law because “in the fashion of most Internet law conundrums [it] fails 
to fit well in existing doctrinal categories.”73 Emergent works fail to 
fall clearly into the category of tool or joint author and require factual 
assessment of who is (or what is) contributing what.74 
Boyden also argues that emergence disrupts the theoretical rationale 
behind originality doctrine, “destabilize[ing] copyright law’s approach 
to authorship by obscuring the connection between the creative 
process and the work.”75 Because one can no longer assume that any 
variations in a work stem from a human author’s hand, emergent 
algorithmic authorship threatens originality doctrine’s assumption that 
almost everything is adequately creative.76 I would qualify this as a 
deeper kind of disruption, one level up from tweaking the doctrine, 
but not quite at the level of threatening foundational theories (such as 
utilitarianism) behind the law. 
In contrast to Boyden and Bridy, James Grimmelmann claims that 
computer authorship is not disruptive at all. Grimmelmann explains 
that algorithmic authorship will in practice be a diverse set of practices 
triggering a variety of existing copyright doctrinal thickets: about 
digital copies, about algorithmic generation, about contribution from 
both programmers and users, and more.77 According to 
Grimmelmann, “[o]ld-fashioned pen-and-paper works raise all of the 
same issues; there is nothing new under the sun.”78 
What I take from the existing literature is the following: the U.S. 
copyright system has already moved far enough away from romantic 
authorship for algorithmic authorship to be, perhaps surprisingly, not 
fundamentally disruptive. And importantly, the reasons for this shift 
 
 73 Boyden, supra note 23, at 379. See also Gregory N. Mandel, History Lessons for a 
General Theory of Law and Technology, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 551, 552 (2007) 
(explaining that with new technologies, “preexisting legal categories may no longer 
apply”). 
 74 See id. at 385-87 (evaluating whether emergent programs are more like a word-
processor, which is basically a tool; or like early arcade games, where even though a 
user introduces variation, the amount of creativity inserted by the game developer 
means it is authored by the game developer); id. at 387 (discussing cases from 1980s 
federal courts); id. at 387-88 (imagining that joint authorship could be found for high-
user-contribution games). 
 75 Id. at 380. 
 76 Id. at 384. 
 77 Grimmelmann, supra note 23, at 404. 
 78 Id. 
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away from the romantic author — the disruption of a romantic 
foundation for U.S. copyright law — have nothing to do with current 
technology. Algorithmic authorship did not kill the romantic author; 
other things did. As Bracha has extensively chronicled, developments 
as far back as the nineteenth century threatened this romantic model. 
Algorithmic authorship thus does not walk into a vacuum in 
copyright law. An earlier set of technologies (or again, really, social 
practices combined with technology) raised similar conversations 
about authorship in copyright. As discussed in the “microworks” 
literature, the internet and digital technologies enabled both lower-
cost collaboration across even great distances, and more easy building-
on and combining of clips of existing works.79 This threatened the 
purportedly dominant romantic idea of authorship; instead of works 
being the independent creation of one author whose ideas sprung out 
of nowhere, they could be and often were collaborative and iterative, 
with new works built on top of existing pieces. In reaction, scholars 
challenged this notion of the author as sole and independent actor. 
They characterized these new models of collaborative and iterative 
creation as not so new after all, but an example of what authorship 
really is.80 To the extent algorithmic authorship disrupts copyright law 
by requiring us to reassess the romantic author, that set of issues was 
already raised around far less complex digital technologies. 
It is not that technology has no role in the story. Arguably the shift 
away from romantic authorship was influenced by other, earlier 
technologies and corresponding social practices — such as lower-cost 
printing that gave rise to mass-market paperbacks that led to the 
success of publishers who fought high originality thresholds. But 
technology is not a disrupter in this story in a conventional sense. It 
does not arrive on the scene of law that cannot handle it. It is folded 
into an existing package of doctrine and underlying theory that 
constructs the technology into its existing logics. 
Current technology, in the words of Jack Balkin, may make salient 
existing features of the law.81 In copyright law, this includes the low 
originality threshold and work-made-for-hire law. It also includes the 
theoretical foundations behind these legal rules: the theoretical 
emphasis in the United States on utilitarianism rather than moral 
 
 79 See Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 575, 610-11 (2005); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and 
Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 621 (2010). 
 80 See Woodmansee & Jaszi, supra note 47, at 3 (showing that early printed works 
in the United States involved large-scale collaboration). 
 81 Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 4, at 2, 15, 32 (2004). 
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rights; relatedly looking to market forces to determine the value of a 
creative piece; and relatedly judicial avoidance of aesthetic 
judgments.82 These are aspects of copyright law that come back into 
the spotlight when the law is applied to technology that returns us to 
the conversation about authorship, whether that be digital technology 
that allows for the creation of microworks and collaborative works, or 
algorithmic technology that allows for nonhuman (or more-
attenuated-human) authorship. 
Technology does not just make salient features of the law, however. 
This would imply that it still acts on the system from outside the 
system, as a highlighter. Technology is interpreted into the law 
through existing systems of legal meaning, whether that meaning is on 
the level of doctrinal detail, or theoretical foundation. Algorithmic 
authorship matters to copyright law because authorship as a concept 
matters to copyright law. This technology comes into the law through 
that existing framing of authorship. 
III. ALGORITHMIC AUTHORSHIP AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Algorithmic authorship produces different consequences in First 
Amendment law, because authorship is constructed differently in First 
Amendment law.83 On a textual, theoretical, and doctrinal level, the 
First Amendment differs from copyright law. The meaning of 
emergence — the kinds of disruption it creates, the receptivity of this 
particular area of the law to it — differs as well. 
The First Amendment protects speakers, including authors. But 
unlike copyright law, it does not do so explicitly in its text. As written, 
the First Amendment constrains Congress — “Congress shall make no 
law. . . abridging the freedom of speech” — rather than protecting 
particular actors.84 In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has nodded 
to this so-called negative view of the First Amendment, constraining 
lawmakers even when there was no showing of impact on an actual 
 
 82 Yen, supra note 65, at 248 (“[O]rthodox interpretations of copyright law leave 
little, if any, room for aesthetics.”); see also Boyden, supra note 23, at 380 n.14 (“[T]he 
threshold for creativity has purposefully been kept at a minimal level, following 
Justice Holmes’s concern that federal judges were competent at assessing neither 
popular culture nor avant-garde art.”). 
 83 But see Bambauer, Copyright, supra note 33, at 8 (showing a recent trend for 
unifying the two); Buccafusco, supra note 33, at 1231 (describing how theories of 
authorship affect the applications of copyright law). 
 84 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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human speaker.85 Textually, then, the First Amendment leaves even 
more room for algorithmic authors than the Progress Clause does. 
The dominant theories behind First Amendment protection — the 
marketplace of ideas model, the democratic self-governance approach, 
autonomy theory — all also leave greater room for algorithmic 
authors, as noted at length by my co-authors Toni Massaro and Helen 
Norton.86 In brief: First Amendment protection that is based on the 
marketplace of ideas will protect algorithmic speech as long as it 
brings more speech to the table for human audiences. First 
Amendment protection based on democratic self-governance will 
protect algorithmic speech if it contributes to the public sphere and 
human audiences’ ability to participate in politics. Even First 
Amendment protection premised on protecting (human) autonomy 
from government intervention will protect algorithmic speech if 
government intervention would harm the autonomy of human 
audiences. In short, like the utilitarian theory of copyright law, 
contemporary First Amendment theories contemplate the value of 
algorithmic speech to human audiences and thus leave room for the 
protection of AI speech in the name of humans.87 
First Amendment doctrine poses different puzzles around 
emergence than copyright does. Where, remember, copyright law 
slotted the question of emergence into primarily two doctrinal areas — 
originality doctrine and work-made-for-hire law — First Amendment 
doctrine presents different questions. There is no originality or 
creativity requirement in First Amendment law; speech receives 
protection because it is speech, not because it is of high or low value 
or creativity. Doctrinally, this is reflected in U.S. courts’ general refusal 
to employ proportionality analysis — to balance the value of speech 
against the degree of harm it causes.88 
 
 85 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) (holding that the 
government’s intent to violate the First Amendment is enough to trigger a First 
Amendment violation); see Massaro et al., supra note 23, at 2493 (“[T]his negative 
view understands the Free Speech Clause as ‘indifferent to a speaker’s identity or 
qualities — whether animate or in-animate, corporate or nonprofit, collective or 
individual.’”). 
 86 Massaro & Norton, supra note 17, at 1176-79; Massaro et al., supra note 23, at 
2490 (“The production of ideas and information is what matters, regardless of 
source.”). 
 87 Massaro & Norton, supra note 17, at 1193 (“We have explored here whether a 
future, vastly more sophisticated Siri and her strong AI colleagues could hold 
constitutional free speech rights, not just as human-operated tools, but as independent 
rights bearers.”). 
 88 Margot Kaminski, Copyright Crime and Punishment, 73 MD. L. REV. 587, 589 
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The doctrinal question faced by algorithmic (and other) expression 
in First Amendment law is not one of originality. Instead, it is whether 
something is speech at all, and thus covered by the First Amendment. 
This is also known as the question of salience89 — is the activity at 
issue even salient to (and thus covered by) the First Amendment? For 
example, movies were originally not considered to be speech covered 
by the First Amendment;90 this decision was later overruled as society 
changed and movies became more socially accepted as expression.91 
And large swatches of what is clearly speech, such as speech integral 
to criminal conduct,92 are not covered by the First Amendment. This 
question of salience has more recently been applied to computer 
code,93 to raw data,94 and to video recording.95 Each of these 
technologies has been subjected to the question of whether it is in fact 
speech for First Amendment purposes. 
Is algorithmic speech then speech for purposes of the First 
Amendment? Or really, are emergent algorithms protected speakers? A 
number of scholars have addressed this question in the context of 
discussing search engines. There, because of existing First 
Amendment doctrine that protects newspaper editors but provides 
lesser protection for telecommunications providers,96 they face a 
doctrinal categorization question. Are search engines — whose output 
is authored by an algorithm — more like newspaper editors, who 
receive full First Amendment coverage and protection, or more like 
backbone telecommunications service providers? 
 
(2014) (comparing “proportionality analysis that most of the world’s constitutional 
courts use . . . with the Supreme Court’s tiered framework of review in First 
Amendment doctrine”) [hereinafter Kaminski, Copyright Crime]. 
 89 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1804 (2004). 
 90 Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 241-43 (1915).  
 91 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952). 
 92 Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 983-84 (2015). 
 93 See Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 713, 716 (2000) (analyzing if and when the First Amendment applies to 
encryption source code).  
 94 See Jane R. Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 70-71 (2014) 
(challenging the assumption that the collection of data is not speech). 
 95 See Alan K. Chen & Justin F. Marceau, Free Speech and Democracy in the Video 
Age, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 996-97 (2016) (arguing that video recording is protected 
speech under the First Amendment); see also Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the 
Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167, 171 (2017).  
 96 Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 385-90 (1969). 
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Eugene Volokh has claimed that search engines are protected 
speakers, just like newspaper editors,97 while Tim Wu disagrees, 
explaining that such purported speakers are more like passive carriers 
or conduits, which receive lesser protection in First Amendment 
doctrine.98 Similarly, Frank Pasquale and Oren Bracha explain that 
search engines try to have it both ways, presenting themselves as 
passive conduits for purposes of liability and active editors when 
seeking First Amendment protection.99 According to Pasquale and 
Bracha, the “prevailing character” of search engine results is “not to 
express meaning but . . . to do things in the world,” making search 
engines more functional than communicative and thus perhaps not 
covered by the First Amendment at all.100 James Grimmelmann takes a 
third approach, proposing treating search engines as advisors — 
covered by the First Amendment, but less fully protected and having 
significant obligations to their users.101 
These categorization discussions look like the type of disruption 
described by Boyden in copyright law. They are disruptions at the 
level of doctrine, because the law’s existing doctrinal categories are not 
well suited for the newer technology. In the case of the First 
Amendment and search engines, the law developed to have two 
different categories, editors and telecommunications conduits, and the 
technology of search engines disrupts this by instigating discussion of 
where the new technology properly falls. 
The disruption is set up by the law itself, which created these 
categories. In a legal system that treated editors and 
telecommunications providers equally, the technology would not 
trigger this discussion — or disruption — at all. And as we saw in the 
discussion of copyright law, even subparts of the same legal system 
will not address the same categorization questions. 
AI authors will not all be search engines, however, pointing readers 
to other peoples’ content. Many, like Twitter bots, will just be 
straightforward speakers, creating content rather than curating or 
guiding others. Consequently, most AI authors likely will not face this 
precise categorization puzzle over editors and telecommunications 
services. Instead, the question of whether emergent machine speech is 
 
 97 Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for 
Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 885 (2012). 
 98 Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1521-22 (2013). 
 99 Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission — Access, Fairness, 
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1193 (2008). 
 100 Id. 
 101 James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 893 (2014). 
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salient to the First Amendment occurs at two possible levels: a social/
cultural one, and a fine doctrinal one. On the social or cultural level, 
the question of whether AI speech is covered by the First Amendment 
is a broader question of whether humans accept AI speakers as 
speakers.102 On the doctrinal level, emergent algorithmic authorship 
could disrupt a particular doctrinal test within the First Amendment. 
In a subset of cases, the question of whether something is speech for 
purposes of the First Amendment manifests as a question of whether 
some act constitutes speech or conduct.103 In Spence v. Washington, the 
Supreme Court asked whether taping a peace symbol to an upside-
down flag constituted speech.104 The Court explained that because the 
action constituted “an intent to convey a particularized message,” and 
“in the surrounding circumstances . . . the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it,” it was covered by the First 
Amendment.105 This Spence test, requiring an intent to convey a 
particularized message that is likely to be understood, was used by the 
Court in later cases evaluating the protection of parades, and of flag 
burning.106 Stuart Benjamin suggests applying a variant of the Spence 
test to algorithmic speech, asking whether there is “a [substantive] 
message that is sendable and receivable and that one actually chooses 
to send.”107 
At the doctrinal fine edges, emergent algorithmic authorship could 
disrupt this question. The Spence test asks whether a speaker intends to 
communicate a message that is likely to be understood.108 Can an AI 
speaker have adequate intent to communicate a message, for purposes 
of this test?109 A court could choose to reject emergent speech if it 
 
 102 Andrew Tutt, Software Speech, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 77 (2012) 
(“Software, in other words, should be considered not for what it is or even what it says 
but for what it means to society to treat it like speech.”). 
 103 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370-72 (1968) (analyzing whether 
destruction of draft cards was speech or conduct). 
 104 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 405 (1974). 
 105 Id. at 410-11. 
 106 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402-03 (1989). 
 107 Benjamin, supra note 33, at 1461. 
 108 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11 (1974). 
 109 Benjamin, supra note 32, at 1481 (“At that point, we might say that the 
connection to the human creators is sufficiently attenuated . . . . Extending the First 
Amendment to messages produced by this artificial intelligence would raise the 
specter . . . [of] treating the products of machines like those of human minds.”). 
  
610 University of California, Davis [Vol. 51:589 
decides that AI cannot have intent, or does not adequately express the 
intent of its human programmer.110 
But this mischaracterizes how the Spence test has historically been 
used. Spence does not line draw between, say, one novel and another 
— it line draws between a novel and flag burning.111 To say that an 
article or novel written by an algorithm does not constitute speech is 
to misunderstand the work the doctrine currently does in 
distinguishing physically situated speech from more abstract speech 
on the page. An article written by an algorithm is as “speechy” as an 
article written by a human, from the perspective of a human reader. 
Returning to my work with Massaro and Norton: if what we care 
about is the perspective of human readers, or listeners, or informed 
citizens, it should not matter whether the algorithm had an intent to 
produce the work or not.112 What should matter is whether the work 
reads as speech to those who encounter it. A government that censors 
a political novel written by an algorithm is as problematic from the 
perspective of a reader as a government that censors a political novel 
written by Tolstoy. 
IV. COMPARING COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Emergent machine authorship will thus trigger and interface with 
different doctrinal and theoretical questions in copyright and First 
Amendment law — differently disrupting the law, with the same 
technology. Where copyright asks (or really does not ask) whether a 
work is minimally creative enough, the First Amendment asks 
whether a work is speech or action. Where copyright doctrine 
contemplates whether a machine can be a co-author or a tool, First 
Amendment doctrine asks whether it is an editor or a communications 
conduit. Where copyright theory asks if the law provides adequate 
incentives for the production of beneficial creative work, First 
Amendment theory asks whether protecting a work informs citizens, 
 
 110 Intent also plays a role in the historic First Amendment exceptions, which I 
discuss elsewhere with co-authors but refrain from delving into here. Massaro et al., 
supra note 23, at 2507 (discussing the doctrinal standard for defamation). 
 111 Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, 
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 373 (2011) (describing how 
the Supreme Court now accepts that images are covered as speech, without inquiring 
whether they convey a particularized message likely to be understood). 
 112 Massaro et al., supra note 23, at 2487 (explaining that “[c]onferring . . . AI 
speakers with First Amendment rights is consistent with free speech theories that 
focus . . . on expression’s usefulness to human listeners”). 
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increases the amount of speech in the marketplace, or protects reader 
and listener autonomy. 
The relationship between copyright and First Amendment law is 
complicated, to say the least.113 Copyright is the “engine of free 
expression,” incentivizing the production of more speech at the same 
time that it clearly creates hurdles to downstream speech.114 Thus 
ascribing copyright protection — ascribing ownership in speech — 
does not and will not perfectly overlap with ascribing First 
Amendment protection — protecting freedom of expression.115 A 
comparison of underlying theories helps explain why. 
The underlying theories behind copyright and First Amendment 
law— and consequently, the doctrinal treatment of authors and their 
output — are not one-to-one matches.116 For example, free speech law 
protects short utterances such as “Fuck the Draft,” under a hybrid 
marketplace-of-ideas and democratic self-governance rationale and 
certainly under autonomy theory.117 Under autonomy theory, telling 
someone not to utter this phrase impinges on her autonomy without 
mitigating an adequately significant harm. Under the marketplace of 
ideas theory, “Fuck the Draft” is protected because it contributes to 
the pool of ideas from which listeners draw; under democratic self-
governance theory, it is protected because it is a political utterance. 
But while “Fuck the Draft” is protected as free expression, it is likely 
not afforded copyright protection,118 because both utilitarianism and 
 
 113 See Kaminski, Copyright Crime, supra note 88, at 599-600 n.90 (identifying 
criticisms of the U.S. approach to copyright law and free speech). 
 114 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 115 But see Bambauer, Copyright, supra note 33, at 3 (“[W]here one finds a work 
with sufficient authorship to obtain copyright protection, one should nearly always 
conclude that the work merits protection against regulation based on freedom of 
speech.”); Buccafusco, supra note 33, at 1231. 
 116 The theories behind First Amendment protection do overlap in places with the 
dominant theories behind copyright protection. For example, the marketplace of ideas 
rationale, which theorizes that we protect speech so as to increase the amount of ideas 
in the marketplace, could be characterized as a type of utilitarianism, protecting 
individual authors’ speech so that there is a larger pool of high value speech available 
for audiences.  
 117 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (“The constitutional right of free 
expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is 
designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public 
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands 
of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more 
capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach 
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our 
political system rests.”). 
 118 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 35, at § 313.4(C) (stating the Copyright 
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natural rights theory dictate that short phrases, or the building blocks 
of future communication, should not be owned by individuals.119 
Utilitarianism suggests that copyrighting a short phrase would put up 
barriers to future speech by creating the kinds of licensing thickets or 
anti-commons decried by most copyright scholars.120 This would 
decrease net social welfare. And natural rights theory dictates that 
when authors write short phrases such as this, they may not have put 
enough labor in to deserve ownership of the outcome. 
Thus if an algorithmic author writes “Fuck the Draft,” then the 
answer to the questions “is this speech protected under the First 
Amendment” and “does this speech receive copyright protection” will 
be different. This is not because the author is an algorithm, but 
because the theories behind the areas of law dictate different answers 
regardless of whether the author is human or an AI. 
That is, different subparts of the legal system may produce different 
results for the same speech by the same technology — not because of 
some inherent feature of the technology, but because these subparts 
serve different theoretical purposes. The same feature (emergence) of 
the same technology (algorithmic authors) will be received differently 
in these two areas of the law. 
As the doctrine develops — as judges and scholars confront 
doctrinal categorization questions and call on theory to help answer 
them — there may be further divergence between the two areas of law. 
It may make sense under, say, a democratic self-governance theory to 
afford First Amendment protection to an algorithmically authored op-
ed, treating the AI more like an editor or speaker than a 
communicative tool, at the same time that it may make sense from a 
utilitarian perspective not to ascribe joint authorship to the machine 
because an AI cannot be incentivized, or human authors are already 
adequately incentivized. 
Despite theoretical differences, there are some fundamental 
similarities between these two areas of law as currently developed. It 
just so happens that the doctrinal hurdles for authorship in both 
copyright and First Amendment law are low enough that algorithmic 
authorship could plausibly pass both. One could imagine 
counterfactuals where this were not the case. For example, say 
copyright’s originality requirement was higher, and required real 
human ingenuity of its authors, rather than just a “modicum of 
 
Office’s policy of not registering words or short phrases as copyrightable “because they 
contain a de minimis amount of authorship”). 
 119 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 79, at 580; Van Houweling, supra note 79, at 621. 
 120 Hughes, supra note 79, at 608. 
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creativity.” Then judges would be faced with evaluating, doctrinally, 
whether a machine were capable of human ingenuity — whether an AI 
were creative enough to count as an author, and whether such 
creativity would ever bestow authorship on something non-human. 
Or one could imagine a First Amendment that, as free expression 
law does in other countries, balanced the value of particular speech 
against the harm it causes.121 That version of the First Amendment 
might, again, look to the value of the speech at issue, including 
evaluating its creativity or artistic and social merit. But under current 
theory and doctrine, we have copyright law and First Amendment law 
that make — perhaps surprising — room for AI authorship. 
This suggests that the stories behind the development of a 
conception of authorship in copyright and First Amendment law 
might be similar. In copyright law, as discussed above, a confluence of 
interested actors, a change in judicial philosophy, and a shift towards 
appreciating the market value of creative goods over intrinsic value all 
pushed away from romantic authorship.122 In First Amendment law, 
the story is fairly similar. Courts have shifted First Amendment 
doctrine away from proportionality (balancing rights) to a categorical 
approach (all speech is salient, with slim exceptions such as 
obscenity), at least in part as a reaction to historic decisions 
underprotecting political speech in the 1950s.123 This can also be 
understood as the shift towards formalistic judging instead of judging 
weighted with social values. In fact, current judicial refusals to weigh 
the value of speech in First Amendment law echo the aesthetic 
nondiscrimination doctrine in copyright law (and vice versa), 
reflecting a fear of individual judicial bias and favoring purportedly 
neutral formal analysis. 
In First Amendment doctrine, as in copyright doctrine, powerful 
actors have realized the power of the doctrine and its relationship to 
their interests at stake. Where cases used to be litigated predominantly 
by news organizations, recent First Amendment cases have been 
 
 121 See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1015, 1029, 1064 (2015) (describing how hate speech is often prohibited in other 
countries after weighing the harms and value of such speech). 
 122 Bracha, supra note 47, at 201. 
 123 See Margot E. Kaminski, The First Amendment’s Public Relations Problem: A 
Response to Alexander Tsesis’s Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP 
OPINIONS 103, 108 (“Courts’ aversion to balancing in the First Amendment context 
also stems from important historical examples. Use of the ‘clear-and-present-danger 
test’ in the 1950s gave First Amendment balancing a bad name, as the Court 
condemned minority propagandists who turned out, with some historical distance, to 
have been potential drivers of important social change.”). 
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brought by commercial actors seeking deregulation.124 I do not intend 
here to take a side in the conversation about the validity of these 
claims, just to note the parallels between the development of copyright 
law and First Amendment law, with commercial and non-individual 
actors using doctrinal footholds to push for the extension of a rights 
regime to cover non-individual authorship or speech.125 
Algorithmic authorship thus encounters two existing scenes of 
regulation that have room for non-human authors. This is not because 
emergent machine authorship impacted the law; it is because the law 
developed in a way that makes a particular meaning of emergence. 
Copyright and First Amendment law as currently developed and 
theorized construct emergence in a relatively non-disruptive way. The 
disruption may come, instead, as courts balk at giving ownership or 
authorship to an actual non-human, requiring a reconfiguration of, 
say, originality doctrine, or a move up to questioning just how 
utilitarian U.S. copyright law is. 
CONCLUSION 
The impact of AI (emergence) on two areas of law that address 
authorship — copyright and First Amendment law — is determined in 
large part by those areas of law themselves. Emergent machine 
authorship does not disrupt the law because emergence, or 
algorithmic “intelligence,” is some sort of inherently and particularly 
disruptive quality of new technology. It encounters existing legal 
doctrine and theory, and is more or less disruptive based on how that 
doctrine and theory has developed. 
In U.S. copyright and First Amendment law, emergence or AI 
disrupts the concept of authorship less than one might expect, because 
in both areas of law, romantic authorship has already been disrupted 
by other forces. It may be surprising, in both copyright and First 
Amendment law, that authorship does not center around 
humanness.126 While algorithmic authorship may make that quality 
 
 124 See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 133 (2015) 
(“[T]he First Amendment possesses near total deregulatory potential . . . . [and] 
operates as the fullest boundary line of constitutional state action.”). But see Jane. R. 
Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 
360-61 (2017) (advocating direct regulation of conduct rather than indirect regulation 
of speech and information). 
 125 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371-72 (2010) (“The 
First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and 
shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.”). 
 126 Massaro et al., supra note 23, at 2482 (“First Amendment law increasingly 
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visible — or salient — it did not cause or create that feature of the law. 
It has been interpreted into it. 
Examining emergent machine authors and their interface with U.S. 
law illustrates several ways in which technology can be legally 
disruptive. Technology can require minor doctrinal tweaks, as in the 
case of work-for-hire doctrine and AI authorship. Or it can fall 
between existing legal categories, as in the case of assessing whether 
search engines are editors or conduits. Or technology can trigger a 
reassessment of underlying theories behind the law, whether lower 
level theorization of what it means to be an author in copyright, or 
higher level theorization of why we protect speech in a democracy. 
Technology is clearly not the only element interpreted into a system 
of legal meaning that triggers such legal moments. Social change can 
similarly break down existing legal categories, and require theoretical 
reassessments. (One can, in fact, characterize technological changes as 
a type of social change.127) Even new fact patterns can lead to these 
kinds of assessments. Thus a bigger question is: what, if anything, is 
unique about technological disruption of the law? 
One answer is that technology as a type of change may merely speed 
up the legal processes that naturally occur anyway. Technological 
disruption is often characterized as being a “pacing problem,” in 
which law cannot keep up with technological expertise and change.128 
In conversations about technology and legal disruption, we often 
presume a confluence between newness and unregulability. 
Emergent authorship is not, in either copyright or First Amendment 
law, disruptive in the sense that the law cannot function around it or 
keep up with new technological developments. Emergence is not 
unregulable, at least not in these legal contexts. It may shift the 
conversation in both copyright and First Amendment law from 
applying existing doctrine up to the level of theory, to determine 
whether the current state of the doctrine is doing what we want it to 
do. But emergence does not escape the law; it encounters, is 
interpreted through, and is shaped by it. 
 
focuses not on protecting speakers as speakers but instead on providing value to 
listeners and constraining the government.”). 
 127 Lyria B. Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change?, 8 MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 589, 598 (2007) (“Technological change is one type of social 
change.”). 
 128 Id. at 600 (“While technological change is not as sudden as might be 
imagined . . . it is usually speedier than social change and thus prompts more urgent 
calls for the law to ‘catch up.’”). 
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Thus legal disruption — the disruption of law by technology — is 
not always a story of technological exceptionalism or technological 
determinism. Legal analysis is not a matter of determining what it is 
about a particular technology that will act upon the law to challenge 
it, or change it, or destroy it. Legal disruption is largely a conversation 
about what a technology encounters. The law matters as much to this 
conversation as the technology does. 
